

# 1 Linking Landlords to Uncover 2 Ownership Obscurity

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4 Preprint at SocArXiv

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**Code availability:** Code for cleaning, fuzzy-matching and linking available at:  
<https://github.com/forrest-h/linking-landlords>.

**Data availability:** All data except Corporation Records available at the [Boston Area Research Initiative's Data Portal](#). MA Corporation Records available upon request.

**Funding:** This work was supported by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, (grant number NSF GRFP DGE 1419118).

**Conflicting interests:** The author declare no conflicting interests.

**Work in Progress:** This preprint is a work in progress and the final version may differ from the current work.

## 10 Abstract

11 Defining the ownership of rental housing can be a difficult task. In recent years there has been an  
12 increasing obscurity of ownership in administrative records as more property owners use Limited  
13 Liability Companies (LLCs) on deeds and in tax assessment records. In many cases, this obscures  
14 the nature and scale of ownership and makes research into property ownership, investors, and  
15 landlords more challenging. To overcome these challenges, we compare different text-matching  
16 methods within property tax assessment records in Boston, MA from 2004-2019. We show that  
17 the source of the difficulty in creating an accurate knowledge of landlords and their portfolios of  
18 properties has shifted in the past decade from the scale of data and the messy nature of  
19 administrative data to an intentional strategy of obscurity through LLCs. To do so, we incorporate  
20 linking to corporate records to uncover intentional ownership obscurity. We assess the  
21 prevalence of obscurity among landlords as well as the extent to which it is undermining our  
22 ability to observe patterns in rental housing in ways that cannot be accounted for solely with  
23 text-matching. These include how obscurity hides not only an increasing consolidation of  
24 property ownership in the past decade, but also concentrations of disorder and evictions. In  
25 doing so, we demonstrate a comprehensive method for uncovering this obscurity and show how  
26 this representation of property ownership can form the basis for understanding inequities in  
27 rental housing and the effects of property consolidation.

28

## 29 Introduction

30 In his 1966 book, *The Tenement Landlord*, George Sternlieb posed an important question enroute  
31 to understanding the state of urban housing and the possibilities of urban renewal: Who owns  
32 the slums? To answer this deceptively simple question for even a small sample of tenements in  
33 Newark, NJ, Sternlieb and his team of researchers manually compiled a directory of real estate  
34 owners, real estate transactions, and title deeds to determine the plausible owners of 566 parcels.  
35 The effort of this search led Sternlieb to state: "Defining the ownership of slum tenements is a far  
36 from easy task" (Sternlieb 1966, 54). As researchers today continue to ask about landlord strategies  
37 and their impact on housing conditions, eviction practices, and the overall equity of rental housing,  
38 we still must answer the question: Who owns rental housing? And the process of answering this  
39 deceptively simple question continues to be no easy task.

40 Recent research has elevated and highlighted the significant role landlords play in the physical  
41 and social conditions tenants experience (e.g., Desmond and Wilmers 2019; Garboden and Rosen  
42 2019; Gomory 2021; Immergluck et al. 2020; Seymour and Akers 2020; Travis 2019). Central to this

43 emerging understanding is a need to have an accurate knowledge of the characteristics of land-  
44 lords and their portfolio of rental properties. An accurate depiction of inequities in rental housing,  
45 differences in landlord-tenant relationships, and the effects of property consolidation (i.e., more  
46 properties owned by fewer landlords) should be grounded in an accurate representation of prop-  
47 erty ownership. In the decades since 1966 there have been two significant developments affecting  
48 the process of creating an accurate representation of property ownership. First, there have been  
49 many advances in digitizing records, computing power, and open access to administrative data  
50 (Thakuria, Tilahun, and Zellner 2017). In many jurisdictions, tax assessment data containing own-  
51 ers' names and addresses can be easily obtained. One might reasonably assume that this would  
52 make discovering the ownership of 566 parcels or even the parcels of a whole city a trivial task.  
53 However, there are complications for this assumption, especially when identifying consolidation.  
54 Although a single entity might own many properties, its name or contact information might not be  
55 entered the same way in every record – creating errors that needed to be corrected. Fortunately,  
56 advances in text matching methods have significantly increased our ability to deal with the issues  
57 of messy data (Tahamont et al. 2021).

58 The new availability of data and ability to deal with messy administrative data has not been  
59 matched by a new ease in understanding ownership because of the second significant develop-  
60 ment: an increase in the obscurity of ownership. Ownership obscurity is the result of using mul-  
61 tiple corporate entities to make property ownership untraceable solely within tax assessment or  
62 property transactions data. Through a desire to limit personal liability for issues and property  
63 conditions, landlords have been increasingly turning to the Limited Liability Company (LLC) as the  
64 preferred form of property ownership (Travis 2019; Gomory 2021). The use of LLCs to limit liability  
65 also creates a new form of ownership obscurity: identifiable and linkable information is replaced  
66 by a corporate entity. This can effectively negate the previous advances in linking property owners  
67 – even the most advanced and accurate fuzzy-matching method will never overcome the challenge  
68 of linking two differently-named LLCs owned by the same individual. Thus, although we have bet-  
69 ter access to ownership data than ever before, ownership has been increasingly obscured even to  
70 these modern resources through the use of corporate entities.

71 In the current study, we show that corporate ownership obscurity can be uncovered and that  
72 a more accurate answer to the question: “Who owns rental housing?” is possible. We utilize the  
73 significant advances in data availability and text-matching methods as well as combining data on  
74 property ownership with corporate records to quantify consolidation and uncover ownership ob-  
75 scurity. We compare text-matching methods within property ownership data and incorporate cor-  
76 porate records to reveal the consolidation of property ownership that has been obscured. In doing  
77 so, we assess the prevalence of obscurity among landlords as well as the extent to which it is under-  
78 mining our ability to observe patterns in rental housing in ways that cannot be accounted for solely  
79 with text-matching. We further show that this obscurity hides not only an increasing consolidation  
80 of property ownership in the past decade, but also concentrations of disorder and evictions. In  
81 sum, we show that the source of the difficulty in creating an accurate knowledge of landlords and  
82 their portfolios of properties has shifted in the past decade from the scale of data and the messy  
83 nature of administrative data to an intentional strategy of obscurity through LLCs and other corpo-  
84 rate entities. In doing so, we demonstrate a comprehensive method for uncovering this obscurity  
85 and show how this more accurate representation of property ownership can form the basis for  
86 understanding inequities in rental housing, differences in landlord-tenant relationships, and the  
87 effects of property consolidation.

## 88 **Quantifying Consolidation**

89 Landlords with different sized portfolios of properties are likely to exhibit different property man-  
90 agement strategies (e.g., Gomory 2021; Raymond et al. 2018). Creating an accurate understanding  
91 of the sizes of landlords' portfolios and their degree of consolidation is the first step to uncover-  
92 ing these strategies and their effect on a local rental housing. The first step, and traditionally the

93 only step, in discovering the set of properties owned by each landlord is linking named entities  
94 within tax assessment records or property transactions data (e.g., Immergluck et al. 2020; Stern-  
95 lieb 1966). Ideally, one would be able to simply group properties by owners with the same names  
96 and addresses to arrive at a quantification of consolidation. In practice, spelling mistakes, abbrevi-  
97 ations, and other errors can prevent the direct linking of entities. Multiple methods are useful for  
98 correcting for these errors such as automated text cleaning and fuzzy-matching methods.

99 The process of linking entities together is typically known as record linkage (Herzog, Scheuren,  
100 and Winkler 2010). When referring to links within a dataset, this is more commonly known as dedu-  
101 plication. Record linkage has received much attention in recent years with advances in computa-  
102 tional techniques for linking data by matching on identifying information (Tahamont et al. 2021).  
103 Record linkage typically takes one of two approaches: deterministic linkage or probabilistic linkage  
104 (Enamorado, Fifield, and Imai 2019). In deterministic linkage, a set of linking rules are established  
105 and matches are made if the criteria of the linking rules are met. The most common example of  
106 this approach is exact matching, in which the sole criterion is that all relevant identifying informa-  
107 tion is exactly the same across both entities (e.g., matching two properties both owned by exactly  
108 the same entity: 32 Greystone LLC). If stringent criteria are used—with exact matching being the  
109 most extreme example—deterministic linking will minimize incorrectly linking two entities (false  
110 positives) at the cost of increasing the likelihood of missing links between two entities that are true  
111 matches (false negatives).

112 Probabilistic linkage, also known as ‘fuzzy matching,’ estimates a probability of a match between  
113 two entities based on an underlying theoretical model (e.g., comparisons between vectors based  
114 on identifying information, phonetic comparisons, etc.; Fellegi and Sunter 1969; Newcombe et al.  
115 1959). This often requires the researcher to set some threshold for accepting or rejecting matches  
116 – typically through manually reviewing a sample of the matches generated. If properly used, proba-  
117 bilistic methods can have higher overall higher rates of accuracy than deterministic methods (e.g.,  
118 Tahamont et al. 2021; Tromp et al. 2011). However, this can come at the cost of introducing more  
119 false positives.

120 Emerging work has already shown promise in addressing the specific record linkage challenge  
121 of identifying landlords and their properties. For example, Immergluck et al. (2020) used a proba-  
122 bilistic method, specifically a semi-supervised learning algorithm called Dedupe to link ownership  
123 clusters within tax assessment and sales records. This process allowed them to identify probable  
124 portfolios of properties owned by large landlords in Atlanta to understand some of the effects  
125 of property ownership consolidation. In another approach, An et al. (2022) used another semi-  
126 supervised method called OpenRefine to link owners in parcel records for Fulton County, GA. Much  
127 of this work demonstrates that landlords and investors differ based on the size and composition  
128 of their portfolios and this necessarily depends on an accurate understanding of a landlord’s por-  
129 tfolio of properties (e.g., Raymond et al. 2018; Seymour and Akers 2021). While linking solely within  
130 property records might have historically been enough to quantify consolidation, the rise of LLCs  
131 complicates record linkage and requires new strategies to uncover ownership obscurity. As we  
132 elaborate in the next section, LLCs render text-matching within tax assessments or property trans-  
133 actions data insufficient for completely uncovering ownership and consolidation.

### 134 **Ownership Obscurity**

135 Since the 1990s, the LLC has become increasingly popular as a form of ownership over properties  
136 (Travis 2019). The use of corporate entities does not automatically make the process of under-  
137 standing property ownership more difficult – 10 properties owned by Jamie Clark are just as easily  
138 grouped as 10 properties owned by Jamie Clark LLC. However, this is rarely how LLCs and other  
139 forms of corporate ownership are organized. In many cases, those ten properties would each be  
140 held by uniquely named LLCs, such as 12 Grey St LCC, 56 Green St LCC, etc. An owner with 10  
141 properties under 10 different LLCs is at a lower risk level than an owner with 10 properties under  
142 a single LLC. Both are protecting their personal assets, but the use of multiple LLCs protects single

143 properties or groups of properties from the potential lawsuits at other properties. In addition to  
144 lower risk of liability, owners can maintain a relative degree of anonymity. For example, any viola-  
145 tions issued against the property or taxes unpaid will refer to the LLC, not the owners of that LLC  
146 (Demond, 2016). Both the anonymity and the liability benefits make owning properties under LLCs  
147 an adaptive strategy for landlords. It is this obscurity, where properties owned by an individual or  
148 set of individuals are recorded under multiple corporate entities or LLCs, that hinders the process  
149 of understanding who owns what despite the advent of fuzzy matching.

150 Ownership obscurity creates two main issues for understanding the landscape of rental hous-  
151 ing. First, the responsibility for an individual property is hidden. This can create issues with build-  
152 ing collective power among tenants with obscure owners. Two individuals sitting in eviction court  
153 might not know that they have a shared landlord – each having only dealt with a property manager  
154 or seen the impersonal LLC written on their eviction notice. The logistical challenges of forming  
155 tenant unions or collectively bargaining within a 100-unit building are already greatly compounded  
156 when trying to unionize across 100 single-family rental homes. This only becomes more difficult  
157 and even impossible if those 100 tenants are unaware that all of their houses are owned by one  
158 landlord. Furthermore, municipalities looking to work with landlords to mitigate disorder and  
159 crime are at a disadvantage in understanding the scale of problems and the scale of potential  
160 cooperation if they are unable to correctly determine the ownership of properties (O'Brien et al.  
161 2022).

162 The second issue stemming from obscurity is that research into the role of landlords in the  
163 state of rental housing could generate an inaccurate picture if obscurity is not uncovered. Under  
164 a degree of ownership obscurity, properties that are owned by an entity are represented as being  
165 owned by separate entities, reducing the sizes of landlords and increasing the number of separate  
166 landlords. This then causes an issue in any aggregated understanding of landlord characteristics,  
167 such as the distribution of landlord sizes. Without a way to uncover the obscurity, the number of  
168 owners and the scale of their property portfolios could misleadingly show a lack of consolidation.  
169 100 properties under 100 different LLCs could mistakenly show a diversity of ownership and lack of  
170 coordinated management over these properties when in reality those 100 LLCs and 100 properties  
171 could be managed by the same entity. This can also have implications for downstream analyses  
172 of landlords and their properties. For example, examining the eviction rates of different sizes of  
173 landlords could be skewed if landlords are not properly grouped by size because of their obscurity.

174 Fortunately, there is a potential solution to the obscurity created by LLCs, one that requires us  
175 to move beyond linking within a single database to linking within corporate records. In corporation  
176 records, individuals have to report their identities as the owners of LLCs, allowing us to connect 12  
177 Grey St LLC and 56 Green St LLC as both being owned by the same individual. Linking landlords to  
178 their portfolio of properties comes with a few additional challenges that make record linkage more  
179 difficult. First, there is generally no ground truth (i.e., a set of known matches between owners and  
180 their properties) to establish accuracy rates. This makes it more difficult to determine if the link-  
181 age process has successfully identified true positives while avoiding both false positives and false  
182 negatives. Second, there are multiple possible stages of record linkage. Properties owners can be  
183 linked within tax assessment records. LLCs and other corporate entities can be linked to corpo-  
184 ration records. Corporate entities can be linked within corporation records. Gomory (2021) was  
185 the first to take a comprehensive approach to solving this problem, using both deterministic and  
186 probabilistic methods to match entities within property tax records and within corporate records.  
187 Others have used other sources, like SEC filings to uncover ownership structures (e.g., Raymond  
188 et al. 2018). This emerging body of work shows the potential that linking landlords has for un-  
189 derstanding strategies of property management and the effects on housing conditions, markets,  
190 and the experiences of tenants. To aid future research in this area, we will provide a comparison  
191 of linking methods and their various stages to directly assess the need for corporate data linking  
192 to supplement fuzzy matching to accurately quantify consolidation and uncover obscurity and, in  
193 turn, alter the inferences drawn about housing conditions and equity.

194 **The Current Study**

195 In the current study, we show the efficacy of text-matching and demonstrate the need to incor-  
196 porate corporate records into the linking process to overcome the two significant methodological  
197 challenges of understanding property ownership: linking named entities and uncovering inten-  
198 tional ownership obscurity. First, we compare different text-matching methods in linking named  
199 entities within property tax assessment records in Boston, MA from 2004-2019 to show the vari-  
200 ety of matches generated by these different record linkage processes. Second, we show that the  
201 nature of the difficulty in creating an accurate representation of property ownership has shifted in  
202 the past decade to ownership obscurity caused by the rise in LLC usage. To do so, we incorporate  
203 linking to corporate records to demonstrate the added accuracy and ability this method has to  
204 uncover ownership obscurity. Ownership obscurity is both a methodological challenge in under-  
205 standing property ownership and an intentional strategy worthy of further study. We show the  
206 first quantification of ownership obscurity and show that this phenomenon is becoming increas-  
207 ingly more common and obscures increasingly higher levels of property consolidation. We further  
208 show how ownership obscurity also covers concentrations of disorder and evictions – complicat-  
209 ing the study of rental housing quality and landlord-tenant relationships. In sum, we demonstrate  
210 a comprehensive method for uncovering ownership obscurity and show the utility of using this  
211 method in understanding the state of rental housing.

212 **Methods & Data**

213 **Data**

214 We utilize a large-scale set of administrative data from Boston, Massachusetts between 2004-2019.  
215 For the current study, we utilize two main sources of data to understand property ownership: 1)  
216 Tax Assessment records from 2004 to 2019, 2) Corporate Filings from the Massachusetts Corpo-  
217 rate Database. We further utilize eviction records from 2015-2016 and 311 reports from 2010 to  
218 2019 to show the effects ownership obscurity and record linkage have on downstream results.  
219 These data are organized through the Boston Area Research Initiative's Geographical Infrastruc-  
220 ture, a database that geographically links administrative records for Boston at 17 nested geo-  
221 graphic scales (Zoorob et al. 2021).

222 **Ownership Data**

223 We use property-level Tax Assessment records from the City of Boston from 2004 – 2019 as the  
224 base ownership data (Shields et al. 2019). Relevant to the current analyses, tax assessment records  
225 contain the property owner's name and address as well as a parcel-level identifier. While these  
226 data encompass all properties in Boston, we utilize only residential rental parcels in our analyses  
227 to focus on linking landlords.<sup>1</sup> These include 700,675 parcels over the 15-year span. To uncover  
228 ownership obscurity, we use corporate filing records obtained from the Massachusetts Corporate  
229 Database.<sup>2</sup> These filings contain the name of a corporate entity (e.g., Eagle Properties LLC) and the  
230 names, addresses, and unique identification numbers for each individual involved in the ownership  
231 and management of the entity. These data are stored as separate databases. First is a database  
232 of corporations, each with a unique id. Second is a database of individuals and the ids of the  
233 corporations in which they are involved. When linked to one another by these ids, we can link LLCs  
234 in the tax assessments based on their shared individual members.

<sup>1</sup> We define residential rental parcels as those containing a single property with a residential property type and one that either is not owner occupied or is owner occupied but has more than 1 unit. This excludes condominiums that might be rentals as multiple condominium properties can be contained within a single parcel.

<sup>2</sup> Obtained by request to the MA Secretary of the Commonwealth Corporations Division.

235 **Outcomes**

236 We examine two property-level outcomes to demonstrate how obscurity can generate misleading  
237 conclusions and how record linkage can help clarify the distribution of outcomes across landlords  
238 and their properties. First, we look at 311 reports related to housing issues per unit at each parcel-  
239 year from 2010-2019 as a measure of issues experienced at parcels (e.g., unsatisfactory living condi-  
240 tions, pest infestation, etc.; O'Brien, Hangen, and Ristea 2022). Second, we examine eviction court

241 filings for Boston per parcel-year from 2015-2016. Eviction filings were collected and digitized by  
242 the Office of Housing Stability in the Department of Neighborhood Development for the City of  
243 Boston.

## 244 **Linking Process**

245 We use both deterministic and probabilistic record linkage methods to link landlords together. As  
246 mentioned above, record linkage among property owners comes with multiple challenges that we  
247 seek to overcome through our linking process. The ideal would be to compare the results of our  
248 matching process to some ground truth, however no such ground truth exists. As such, we have  
249 to make subjective decisions throughout this process as to what constitutes a match. As much as  
250 possible, we adopt a conservative approach and prioritize minimizing false positives. As ownership  
251 can change between years, we only make within-year matches. The full code for this process can  
252 be found at: <https://github.com/forrest-h/linking-landlords>. Our process is as follows, with examples  
253 of links of both individuals and corporations at each step to illustrate<sup>3</sup>:

<sup>3</sup> While all owner names are obtained from public records, we have chosen to preserve individual anonymity in this publication. To do so, individual names and their associated addresses in examples are fictitious but representative of real individual matches. Corporations and their addresses are provided are not anonymized. While all owner names are obtained from public records, we have chosen to preserve individual anonymity in this publication. To do so, individual names and their associated addresses in examples are fictitious but representative of real individual matches. Corporations and their addresses are provided are not anonymized.

### 254 **Deterministic Linking**

255 Deterministic links are links that follow a set of prescribed rules. The most basic form of determin-  
256 istic links are exact matches. When we link owners based on exact matches between uncleaned  
257 name and addresses from the tax assessment data, 72,703 parcels are matched, corresponding  
258 to 23,640 (3.63%) owners. This highlights the need for more in-depth record linkage methods as  
259 it is highly unlikely that the other 627,972 owner entities in the tax assessment records are truly  
260 unique. This step also involves our first subjective decision – the use of names vs. names and ad-  
261 dresses. For example, when using just names, two individuals named Cameron Robinson would  
262 be linked together, even if their addresses are in Boston, MA and San Diego, CA. Given this issue,  
263 we chose to utilize both owner names and address for exact matches. While using just uncleaned  
264 names does reduce the unique entities from 651,612 to 609,939 owners, we think it is likely many  
265 of these matches are incorrect – especially for individuals.

266 To improve exact match linking, we subject each dataset to a rigorous text cleaning and stan-  
267 dardizing process. As with most administrative data, mistakes and misspellings can occur (e.g.,  
268 Boston vs. Bston). In addition, abbreviations may not be standardized (e.g., corp. vs. corporation).  
269 All of these errors can affect the potential matches and links generated through both deterministic  
270 and probabilistic linking methods. We clean and standardize the text by removing any punctua-  
271 tion, extra spaces, converting all numbers to Arabic numerals, and adjust common misspellings  
272 (e.g., CORP, CRP, CP, and CORPORAITON are all corrected to CORPORATION). The full code and pro-  
273 cess for cleaning can be found in the online supplemental materials. We then make exact matches  
274 based on the cleaned name and address (e.g., Indiv: Ruby Coleman, 55 Huntington St. & Ruby  
275 Coleman, 55 Huntington St.; Corp: Trust Land Trust LLC, 404 S Huntington Ave. & Trust Land Trust  
276 LLC, 404 S Huntington Ave.). This reduces the unique entities from 651,612 to 640,215. However,  
277 there likely are still many missed matches.

### 278 **Probabilistic Linking**

279 After all deterministic links were made, we used two different probabilistic methods to identify pos-  
280 sible matches. First, we used the Dedupe python library, which uses a semi-supervised machine  
281 learning algorithm to identify matches of potential duplicates (Gregg and Eder, n.d.). Generally,  
282 Dedupe is predicting possible matches based on a string similarity metric and uses human-coded  
283 pairs of matches or unrelated pairs to improve the weighting of this similarity metric. This process  
284 involves three steps. First is an unsupervised training stage in which Dedupe provides pairs of pos-  
285 sible matches to be rated by an individual as matches or not. Also known as active learning, this  
286 stage helps improve the accuracy of the weights. Second, using these identified pairs as training  
287 data, Dedupe classifies and matches possible matches, assigning each potential match a proba-  
288 bilistic confidence of matching (0 being not a possible match and 1 being an exact match). Lastly,

<sup>4</sup> While generally we limited matching to within-year, doing this beforehand in Dedupe would mean generating a different set of weights for each year, resulting in potentially different sets of matches across years. We therefore chose to use all years in the same round of Dedupe and limited matches to within-year matches after the classification stage. This results in consistent matches across years.

<sup>5</sup> We did find Dedupe useful for identifying potential additions to our text standardization process as looking at the matched pairs can help to identify patterns that can be coded into text cleaning rules. For example, as seen in Figure 4, there is a large spike in added pairs provided by Dedupe after 2008. This spike is caused by foreclosures and links between banks-owned properties in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Initially, our cleaned names missed many variations used by banks (as their address may vary based on branches and their names are often slightly varied – for example, Deutsche Bank had 30 separate uncleaned names and 302 separate uncleaned names and addresses) and using Dedupe linking solely on names we identified these patterns and then included a separate text cleaning for banks. We therefore recommend the use of Dedupe and other out-of-the box algorithms not as a production-level identifier of matches but as a check in the process for identifying ways to improve deterministic matches. We did find Dedupe useful for identifying potential additions to our text standardization process as looking at the matched pairs can help to identify patterns that can be coded into text cleaning rules. For example, as seen in Figure 4, there is a large spike in added pairs provided by Dedupe after 2008. This spike is caused by foreclosures and links between banks-owned properties in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Initially, our cleaned names missed many variations used by banks (as their address may vary based on branches and their names are often slightly varied – for example, Deutsche Bank had 30 separate uncleaned names and 302 separate uncleaned names and addresses) and using Dedupe linking solely on names we identified these patterns and then included a separate text cleaning for banks. We therefore recommend the use of Dedupe and other out-of-the box algorithms not as a production-level identifier of matches but as a check in the process for identifying ways to improve deterministic matches.

<sup>6</sup> Some have residential, others business, this reduces false positives.

289 a decision needs to be made on the cut-off threshold. Using a low threshold will result in many  
290 false positives, such as Jerry Rodriguez and Martin Rodriguez being paired together. We used the  
291 training data to generate performance metrics and chose the threshold using the lowest value that  
292 returned a false positive rate of less than 1%.<sup>4</sup>

293 We tried two versions of Dedupe. The first matched just on names, while the second matched  
294 on names and addresses. While most of the matches based solely on names retained a high degree  
295 of face validity, we found that Dedupe consistently mismatched names that were similar but clearly  
296 not matches. For example, Elmer H. Gill and Elmer G. Gill would be linked together. When raising  
297 the threshold Dedupe would then miss many matches that had a high degree of face validity. While  
298 the pairs of linked landlords added is consistently higher across years, these pairs tend to be ones  
299 that are textually similar but have low face validity. When linking by names and addresses, Dedupe  
300 tended to miss matches with high face validity but with different addresses. Given these errors we  
301 chose to not use Dedupe to identify matches.<sup>5</sup>

302 We chose to use a more customized form of probabilistic matching to minimize the false posi-  
303 tives generated. Using the cleaned names and addresses, we matched based on the 3-gram cosine  
304 similarity. First, we generated the 3-grams of the combined names and addresses for each year  
305 (e.g., the 3-grams of 'text' are ['te', 'tex', 'ext', 'xt']). We then generated the term frequency-inverse  
306 document frequency matrix for the 3-grams (TF-IDF). This step converts each name and address  
307 to a vector representing the product of the term-frequency (i.e., how frequently a 3-gram appears  
308 in the corpus) and the inverse document frequency (i.e., the commonness or rarity of the 3-gram  
309 across all names and addresses). We then computed the cosine similarity of these vectors and  
310 found the 3 closest matches for each unique cleaned name and address. We then decided on a  
311 threshold that minimizes false positives. We used a threshold of 0.85. We found this resulted in  
312 matches with a high degree of face validity (e.g., Melissa G King, 15 Danvers St. & Melissa King  
313 15 Danvers St.) and minimized false positives. These fuzzy-matched names provide more added  
314 information than just cleaned names, but without the increased addition of low face validity pairs  
315 generated by Dedupe. This reduced the number of unique owners from 640,215 after the cleaning  
316 step to 616,929 unique owners.

### 317 Linking Corporations

318 At this point we have linked landlords deterministically by cleaning and standardizing their names  
319 and probabilistically using a text similarity metric. However, there are still many potential pairs  
320 that are missed by only linking based on text similarity. For example, two LLCs with vastly different  
321 names (e.g., 123 Land Trust LLC and Rental Properties LLC) could be owned and operated by the  
322 same individual. Without added information, no form of text matching will link these two entities  
323 together. This is why we use corporate records to link corporate entities together.

324 We first linked the names of probable corporations to the database of corporations, using the  
325 same deterministic and probabilistic linking processes as above. This provides the id of each corpo-  
326 ration in the tax assessment records (16,121 entities are linked). We then limited the database of  
327 individuals to those associated with the linked ids and use the same deterministic and probabilistic  
328 matching process to deduplicate individuals in the data based on their names and both residen-  
329 tial and business addresses.<sup>6</sup> Next, we generated networks of linked corporations based on their  
330 shared individual members with corporations as nodes and edges representing a shared individual  
331 between both corporations. For example, if Christopher Long is involved in 10 corporate entities  
332 with 5 other individuals, the corporations of those other 5 individuals are all linked together. After  
333 pruning highly connected individuals,<sup>7</sup> we use the connected components of these networks to cre-  
334 ate unique ids for each set of corporations. Combined with the text-based matches of names, this  
335 is the final set of linked landlords. In the end, the linking process reduced the number of unique  
336 owners from 651,612 to 605,731.

<sup>7</sup> For many individuals, the sets of corporations of their co-owners are the same or very similar to their own sets (e.g., Brenda Flores shares the same 3 corporations with Jose Scott). However, for some well-connected individuals, their shared set of corporations might be very different from the majority of their own corporations. If left unresolved, this can generate very large networks that are likely not acting together to own and manage the set of properties owned by all involved. For example, Timothy Parker is part of a group of 10 individuals who own 10 corporations. They also have one shared corporation with Jennifer Moore who is a part of a different group of individuals who own a different set of corporations. To account for this, we use an iterative process of pruning in which we remove these articulation points and their edges and add back in the nodes to their most common set of corporations. In the above example, the shared corporation between Timothy Parker and Jennifer Moore would be removed from the overall network and added back into the connected component that has the larger number of corporations in common. This reduces the number of false positive links between corporations.

## Results

### Linking Process

In the uncleaned tax assessment, there are an average of 40,726 owners per year from 2004 to 2019. Even at this stage, there is evidence of increasing consolidation, as the number of unique uncleaned owners (defined by both a named entity and the associated address) decreased from 42,466 in 2004 to 39,502 in 2019 while at the same time the number of rental units increased from 159,038 to 175,366. Figure 1 illustrates the entire linking process from uncleaned tax assessment records to a final set of linked owners and properties (percentages shown for 2019 only). In the base uncleaned tax assessment data, 4.8% of owners of individual parcels are linked together – in other words in the base data, only 4.8% of owners own multiple parcels (see Step 0 in Figure 1). In Step 1: Data Cleaning of Tax Assessment, 2.3% of owners had changes that linked them to other owners in 2019 for a cumulative 7.1% of owners, 15.6% of parcels, and 27.8% of units with matches. After a customized stage of probabilistic matching (Step 2: Fuzzy-matching within Tax Assessment in Figure 1), 12.3% of owners in 2019 were linked to other owners. Finally, when corporate entities in the tax assessment records are fuzzy-matched to corporation records and then linked to one another based on common individuals involved in the ownership and management of corporations, 16.7% of owners in 2019 are linked to other owners. While 16.7% of owners being linked to other owners might initially seem like a small group, they have an outsized effect on the rental housing landscape, owning 24.3% of parcels and 42.0% of rental units in 2019. This begins to indicate increased consolidation of rental property ownership and the obscurity that covers this consolidation.

### Dedupe vs. Custom Fuzzy-matching

While an out-of-the-box algorithm like Dedupe has the benefits of being relatively easy to use, we found this simplicity actually complicated the process of getting accurate links. As seen in Figure 2, the two Dedupe iterations and the customized fuzzy-matching step share only 2,142 matches (53.2% of the customized fuzzy-matches). These are the most likely true positives as all three methods identified these matches. An additional 1,374 matches were shared between customized fuzzy-matching and one of the Dedupe iterations meaning that only 510 matches were unique to the customized-fuzzy matching. This convergence suggests that the customized fuzzy-matching process aligns with our conservative approach to limiting false positives.


In contrast, both Dedupe iterations have over 4,000 unique matches each – which suggests large numbers of likely false positives. When we used Dedupe on names only (DNO; see Dedupe: Name Only in Figure 2), we found that Dedupe linked 22.7% of owners in 2019 -an increase of over 10% compared to the customized fuzzy-matching stage. However, many of these additional matches would best be classified as false positives. DNO has 5,163 unique pairs when compared to Dedupe using names and addresses (DN&A) and our customized probabilistic fuzzy-matching stage. For reference, here are three random matches<sup>8</sup>: 1) Curtis Gray P, 27 Green St, Boston MA with Curtis Gray P JR, 10 Blue St, Boston MA. 2) OXBOW URBAN LLC 45 Red Ave, Dorchester MA with OXBOW URBAN LLC 165 Green Ave, Dorchester MA. 3) Glenn Ross 4 East St, Boston MA with Glenn Ross 87 Blue Ave, Boston MA. In the first and last example, it is likely that these refer to different people as either they have common names but are at different addresses or they have the potential to be a father and son pair. In the second example, this is a likely true positive. While the fuzzy-matched stage won't link these entities, the corporations data will link these two instances of the same LLC together. While DN&A generated only a slightly higher proportion of owners as the fuzzy-matching stage (16.6% in 2019) these 4,406 unique pairs can also be best classified as false positives and show similar patterns to the above examples for DNO.

As further evidence that Dedupe consistently over-estimates matches between owners, we look at the similarities and differences to the final set of corporation links (see Figure 3). If Dedupe is capturing an accurate links above the custom fuzzy-matching approach, we would expect to see

<sup>8</sup> For privacy, individual names and addresses have been changed but the differences between names have been preserved. For example, if the original pair was John H, 1 First St, Boston, MA with John G, 12 First St, Medford, MA then the privacy-changed pair would be Ben M, 5 Green St, Boston, MA with Ben N, 52 Green St, Medford, MA.




## Recommended Linking Processes




**Figure 1. Recommended Linking Process**

Note: Owners, Parcels, and Units are for 2019 only.



**Figure 2. Set Overlaps Between Dedupe and Custom Fuzzy-Matching Methods**

Note: Black dots indicate which method(s) are involved in the above bar. For example, the first black dot from the left indicates that only Dedupe (Name Only) has 5,163 unique pairs of original owners, while the last connected black dots on the right indicate that all 3 methods share 2,142 pairs.



**Figure 3. Probabilistic Linking Methods Compared to Final Set of Matches**

386 these matches overall significantly with the final set of matches using corporate data. While there  
 387 is significant overlap between these matches, there are also significant amounts of differences,  
 388 with both version of Dedupe having over 3,400 matches that are not in the final set of matches.

### 389 Ownership Obscurity over Time

390 We find a significant increase in ownership obscurity since 2010. As seen in Figure 4, the pairs of  
 391 linked landlords generated by the addition of corporate data has greatly increased since 2012. By  
 392 2019, the number of pairs added is over 4 times that of the fuzzy-matching process. This highlights  
 393 both the increasing obscurity of corporate ownership and the increasing need for linking methods  
 394 that incorporate corporate data. While the cleaning and fuzzy-matching process indicates there are  
 395 37,328 landlords in 2019, the addition of corporate data shows that there are more likely 35,639  
 396 landlords – a reduction of 1,689 (4.5%) fewer landlords.

397 As noted above, while Dedupe Name Only generated more pairs in 2004-2013 than any other  
 398 method, many of these can best be described as false positives. Furthermore, DN&A failed to pick  
 399 up on the consolidation of bank-owned properties in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis as seen  
 400 by a lack of a spike in pairs of connected parcels in Figure 4. This is largely due to banks that list  
 401 their branches at different addresses. Thus, while we tested the use of a semi-supervised learning  
 402 algorithm (Dedupe) into the process of linking landlords, we ultimately decided a more customized



Figure 4. Ownership Obscurity over Time

403 probabilistic method was better suited to the current use case.

#### 404 Effect on Downstream Results

405 To demonstrate the effect of obscurity on our understanding of landlords and their properties  
 406 across linking methods, we look at 3 relevant outcomes: the consolidation of units, evictions,  
 407 and housing-related property issues. For each outcome of interest, we look at the Herfindahl-  
 408 Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of the consolidation of the relevant outcome, here calculated  
 409 as:


$$410 \quad HHI = \sum_{i=1}^N S_i^2$$

411 where  $S$  = a landlord's overall share of an outcome

412 Conceptually, as the HHI approaches 1, this indicates a higher level of overall consolidation where  
 413 fewer owners are responsible for the relevant outcomes. For example, a higher HHI of rental units  
 414 indicates that some owners own an outsized share of units.

415 First, we look at the consolidation of rental units over time (see Figure 5). While the 3 steps prior  
 416 to linking with corporate data show some increases over time in the consolidation of rental units  
 417 over time (a higher HHI in 2019 vs. 2004), using corporate data consistently shows both a higher  
 418 overall level of consolidation across years and a steeper increase in consolidation over time. For  
 419 context, using the final set of links with corporate data shows that while in 2004, the largest 1% of  
 420 owners ( $n = 402$ ) owned 29.3% of units (46,581 units), in 2019 the share of units owned by largest  
 421 1% of owners ( $n = 356$ ) rose to 34.2% (59,957 units). In contrast, fuzzy-matching (without using  
 422 corporate data) shows only a minor increase in the share of units owned by the largest 1% of  
 423 owners: in 2004 ( $n = 404$ ) they owned 28.0% of units (44,603 units) and in 2019 the largest 1% of  
 424 owners ( $n = 373$ ) owned 30.5% of units (53,438 units). Taken together with the results of Figure 5,  
 425 this illustrates the increasing level of consolidation that is only revealed by using corporate data.

426 Finally, we compare linking stages across two outcomes relevant to understanding landlords  
 427 and their management of properties. First, we look at the concentration of 311 reports of housing




**Figure 5. Consolidation of Rental Units**

428 related issues (e.g., Unsatisfactory living conditions, Insufficient Heat, Lead, etc.). We look at the  
 429 HHI of housing issues by calculating a landlord’s share of parcels with housing issues (to control  
 430 for consolidation caused by larger buildings). As seen in Figure 6, the HHI of housing issues is sig-  
 431 nificantly larger after incorporating corporate data – indicating a larger concentration of housing  
 432 related issues compared to other linking methods. For comparison, in 2019 the final set of links  
 433 using corporate data indicates that the largest 1% of landlords (n = 356) own 36.1% of the 2,036  
 434 parcels with housing related issues while linking without corporate data only shows that the largest  
 435 1% of owners (n = 373) own 30.2% of the 2,046 parcels with 311 reports of housing issues. This high-  
 436 lights the dampening effect obscurity has on understanding disparities in property management  
 437 strategies.


438 Lastly, we examine the effect of obscurity on the responsibility for eviction filings. As seen  
 439 in Figure 7, the final set of links with corporate data shows the highest level of concentration of  
 440 eviction filings across owners. For context, in 2016, the largest 1% of landlords (n = 366) were  
 441 responsible for 48.9% of the 2,053 parcels with evictions. Whereas linking without corporate data  
 442 the largest 1% of landlords in 2016 (n = 376) were responsible for 43.8% of the 2,053 parcels with  
 443 evictions. These results suggest that corporate obscurity dampens the disproportionate eviction  
 444 rates of larger landlords.

## 445 Discussion

446 The challenges to creating an accurate representation of property ownership are twofold: admin-  
 447 istrative data ripe with errors and intentional ownership obscurity. We compare the efficacy of  
 448 methods to overcome these two methodological challenges and demonstrate a comprehensive  
 449 method for creating an accurate answer to the question: “Who owns rental housing?” In doing so,  
 450 we have shown that: 1) Ownership obscurity is an increasingly common phenomenon that damp-  
 451 ens the disparities between landlords and the disparate outcomes of their portfolios of properties.  
 452 2) Not all linking methods are equal – only using corporate data is ownership obscurity fully uncov-  
 453 ered. Given these two findings, we strongly recommend that future research involving landlord  
 454 size, comparing outcomes of landlords, and examining the practices of landlords involve the use  
 455 of corporate data and that care is taken to accurately link these data while minimizing false posi-  
 456 tives.



**Figure 6. Consolidation of Housing Issues**



**Figure 7. Consolidation of Evictions**

## 457 **Text-matching in Administrative Data**

458 The first obstacle to creating an accurate representation of property ownership is record linkage.  
459 Entities in tax assessment or other administrative records need to be correctly and accurately  
460 linked. We took a conservative approach to linking – prioritizing a low potential false positive. While  
461 out-of-the-box methods, like Dedupe, are generally easier to use and do create a significant num-  
462 ber of likely true positive matches, we found their level of probable false positives to be too high.  
463 One of the potential reasons for this is that there are some patterns an algorithm is likely to pick  
464 up on that make entities statistically similar but qualitatively very different. For example, a middle  
465 initial has significant meaning but statistically makes two entities only one letter shift away from  
466 one another. This is likely why using Dedupe on names only rendered so many likely false posi-  
467 tives. In our more customized fuzzy-matching method, we are able to fine-tune the methods to the  
468 current use case and more accurately account for these small but significant difference in limiting  
469 false positives.

470 The second significant obstacle is the rise of intentional ownership obscurity. We found that in  
471 the past decade there has been an increase in the number of corporate entities used in tax assess-  
472 ment records and that the use of these entities significantly obscures an increasing consolidation  
473 of properties. The use of corporation records in our linking process was the key to uncover this  
474 intentional ownership obscurity. By linking LLCs whose names and addresses would never be con-  
475 nected by purely text-matching but who were owned and operated by the same set of individuals,  
476 we were able to overcome this significant obstacle.

## 477 **Ownership Obscurity**

478 We found increasing ownership obscurity in the past decade. While this does indicate that discov-  
479 ering ownership is becoming more difficult, the fact that we found this trend indicates that there  
480 is hope for uncovering this obscurity. We have demonstrated a scalable process that can uncover  
481 this obscurity while maintaining a high degree of face validity and avoiding many false positive  
482 links between landlords. Being able to uncover ownership obscurity has both research and prac-  
483 tical applications. For research purposes, one can gain a more accurate understanding of the role  
484 landlords, their characteristics, and nature and size of their real estate portfolio can play in the con-  
485 ditions of properties, treatment of tenants, and the operation of the rental market and stock. In  
486 addition, by uncovering systematic error in the tax assessment records we have revealed an impor-  
487 tant process worthy of study itself (O'Brien 2018). While some ownership is initially hidden due to  
488 the error-prone data generation process, we have revealed systematic, intentional obscurity that  
489 reveals a strategy of property ownership. In other uses, tenant organizers and unions can help  
490 build collective power across buildings – helping tenants find others who live in buildings owned  
491 by their obscured landlords. A notable examples of this include the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project's  
492 Evictorbook – an online tool designed to help organizers and tenants research owners and their  
493 properties ("Evictorbook" n.d.).

494 Our results indicate that ownership obscurity hides a disproportionate share of rental property  
495 ownership, responsibility for disorder and disrepair at rental properties, and eviction filings. While  
496 more research is needed to explore the role between obscurity and strategies of property manage-  
497 ment, these findings begin to indicate that landlords may use obscurity to avoid responsibility for  
498 the physical disorder at their properties. While properties owned by the largest obscured owners  
499 had a disproportionate share of violations, this lack of physical upkeep was accompanied by an  
500 increased social upkeep in the form of a disproportionately large share of eviction filings and a  
501 higher eviction filing rate. More research is needed to explore the different strategies revealed as  
502 we uncover ownership obscurity.

## 503 **Recommendations for Future Research**

504 One limitation of the current work is the lack of an objective ground truth or the known true  
505 matches between LLCs and other entities. This lack of ground truth means that we cannot ob-

506 jectively measure performance by comparing generated matches to true matches. As such, we pri-  
507 oritized a conservative approach and sought to create matches with a high degree of face-validity.  
508 This means that our approach is just one approach to linking landlords and can likely be improved  
509 in future research. For example, if a source of ground truth emerges or is created (perhaps by ex-  
510 amining a sample of landlords and their internal records of their property ownership), one could  
511 likely better fine-tune the current methods and approaches to catch errors. Ultimately, while we  
512 are confident that the current methods are generating a fairly accurate representation of property  
513 ownership, we recognize that future research could improve these methods and we recommend  
514 each. We do offer the following recommendations for future research seeking to uncover property  
515 ownership and ownership obscurity.


516 We found that the most accurate process to uncover ownership obscurity involves rigorous text  
517 cleaning, deterministic linking, customized probabilistic linking, and the use of corporate records.  
518 We recommend avoiding the use of 'black-box' probabilistic linking methods in the final linking  
519 process as their mistakes can create an inaccurate form of uncovered obscurity. These methods  
520 are more suited for exploring systematic errors in text cleaning that can be then incorporated into  
521 rule-based text cleaning and deterministic linking processes. In addition, we found that only by  
522 incorporating corporation records into the process were we able to uncover ownership obscurity.  
523 Given the trends in rise of LLC use, the use of corporation records is likely to be increasingly im-  
524 portant for creating an accurate representation of property ownership. We therefore recommend  
525 investing time in developing a rigorous and scalable process that involves a customized probabilis-  
526 tic fuzzy-matching process and the use of corporate records. To aid in this effort, we have made  
527 all code available in the supplemental resources.

528 While the most accurate process to uncover obscurity involves connecting ownership to cor-  
529 porate records, there may be cases when corporate records are unavailable or prohibitively ex-  
530 pensive to obtain. In these cases, even the best fuzzy-matching process will miss links between  
531 corporations. In these analyses, researchers should take care in interpreting results, especially  
532 as they relate to the size and composition of landlords' real estate portfolios. In such cases, ad-  
533 ditional manual linking may be needed to compensate for the lack of corporate information. For  
534 example, searching the internet for mentions of the largest landlords might return connections  
535 between some entities beyond their cleaned and fuzzy-matched names and addresses. This may  
536 improve the accuracy of linking but can be a large investment of time and personnel. As such we  
537 recommend obtaining corporate records whenever possible.

## 538 **Conclusion**

539 The rise of LLCs and other corporate entities as landowners has led to an increase in ownership  
540 obscurity. Ownership obscurity can misrepresent the size of a landlord's portfolio and their re-  
541 sponsibility for property-level outcomes. While obscurity is on the rise, our understanding of the  
542 processes and data needed to uncover this obscurity are also increasing. Through combination  
543 of deterministic and probabilistic linking methods connecting ownership information to corporate  
544 records, this obscurity can be uncovered. However, the quality and accuracy of the linking process  
545 can differ based on the linking methods used. Using the methods and processes outlined in this  
546 work, we hope future work will be able to uncover obscurity and show a more accurate picture of  
547 landlords and their properties.

548 **Acknowledgment**

549 This preprint was created using the LaPreprint template (<https://github.com/roaldarbol/lapreprint>) by  
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562 practitioners can work together to leverage modern digital data to better understand and serve  
563 cities.

564 **Supplementary Materials**

565 Code for data cleaning, standardization, fuzzy-matching, and linking to corporate records is avail-  
566 able at: <https://github.com/forrest-h/linking-landlords>. All data except Corporation Records available  
567 at the [Boston Area Research Initiative's Data Portal](#). MA Corporation Records available upon re-  
568 quest.

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